TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=90TT1676> <title> June 25, 1990: Interview:Helmut Kohl </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1990 June 25, 1990 Who Gives A Hoot? </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> INTERVIEW, Page 36 Driving Toward Unity </hdr> <body> Sensitive to his country's history, Chancellor Helmut Kohl warns against isolating Germans and argues that unification is not only urgent but will make the '90s the decade of Europe By Henry Muller and Karsten Prager/Bonn and Helmut Kohl Q. Are you concerned about Soviet opposition to a united Germany's membership in NATO? A. Anyone who wants a peaceful new Europe must remember that one of the worst mistakes after the First World War was the international isolation of the Weimar Republic. I am strictly against repeating that mistake. Germany, and that includes a unified Germany, is part of the Western community of shared values. We cannot accept anything less. It is remarkable that all Warsaw Pact countries except the Soviet Union are for full German membership in NATO. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are in favor of it--unconditionally and completely. Why? Simply because they do not want Germany to be isolated. The U.S., all our other allies and the Germans themselves should raise this issue in their talks with the Soviet Union. I think there is a chance here for a positive conclusion. Of course, some transitional arrangements will be needed. It is possible, for example, to allow the stationing of Soviet troops for a certain period in what is today the German Democratic Republic. I also consider it feasible that in the parallel negotiations in Vienna--but not in the Two-plus-Four framework--we talk about troop levels generally. Because one point is very clear: the Soviet Union certainly has a legitimate security interest. Q. A negative way of looking at the question is that the Western allies and some of the East Europeans in fact want NATO to keep the Germans under control. A. I am not concerned at all about motivations. I don't agree with such reasons, but the end result is the same. I want Germany to remain in NATO. The fact that there are reasons that are not particularly friendly to the Germans--well, I can accept that in view of our history. There are many who think, Well, it's better to have a solid roof over the Germans. There are some who want two roofs, NATO and European unity. And I agree. My motives are different, but the results are what count. You'll see; German unification will give a big boost to European unification. Q. Why two roofs? A. German unity in the year 2000 cannot be the same as German unity in 1900. The future of free Europe is not the future of the old nation-state. We are talking about a wider opening, and that is the hour of Europe. It also offers new opportunities to the Germans. That is in keeping with the mood here: the Fatherland is Germany, the future is Europe. That is today's phrase. Had you asked about Europe five or six years ago, you would have used the term Eurosclerosis--the concept of a bad disease associated with Europe. Today no one mentions Eurosclerosis anymore. Instead people are asking, Are you building a Fortress Europe? That's exactly the opposite anxiety. But we are not going to build a Fortress Europe either. I oppose protectionist policies. Q. How will the world continue to change as we approach the year 2000? A. We will reduce the East-West confrontation further. We will make a lot of progress on the road to disarmament and detente. We will still need weapons and soldiers by the year 2000 because even then we will not have freedom for nothing. I am against a disarmament policy that takes announcements as deeds. You must be sure you get something in exchange for your concessions. Q. And how will Europe fit into that world? A. The North-South conflict will become far more dangerous than it is today. I foresee three very important economic regions developing by the year 2000: the U.S. and Canada, perhaps on the road to an association with Mexico; the Far East; and Europe--the European Community--which will continue to grow into a political union, beyond economic union. Europe, of course, is not the E.C. alone. The E.C. is just a torso. A wider network will be constructed with other European countries, not necessarily by making them members but perhaps through association treaties. The Soviet Union too is going to seek its place in this emerging Europe, at least economically. For the Germans, this is essential. Geographically, our location offers great advantages, but there are also disadvantages. For a long time our central location has been more of a scourge and a danger for us. Now it may be our big chance; perhaps we can be the bridge. But we can be that bridge only if what supports it in the West is very strong. That brings me back to NATO and Europe. I am convinced that this is going to be the decade of the Europeans. Q. Do you see the Soviet Union as part of Europe politically too? A. At this moment no one can predict the future of the Soviet Union. I do hope Gorbachev will succeed in his reform policies. I sincerely hope that. Because perestroika means pluralism, and that means opening. This is what the Soviet Union needs; otherwise it will not be in a position to solve its problems, neither those of the nationalities nor those of the economy. I think the West should assist the Soviet Union in this process. Of course, we have to do it in a reasonable, businesslike way; after all, we are talking about a proud country. But we have to do it in the spirit of friendship. Q. Are the Soviets telling you anything bilaterally that they are not saying in public? A. [Laughing] This is not a subject I would discuss with TIME magazine. Q. Let me rephrase... A. You need not continue. I am not going to say anything on that. I know what you were going to ask. Q. Can you simply proceed toward unity and NATO membership and say, "This is what we are going to do, whatever Gorbachev may say"? A. No, we have to negotiate. No question about that. Of course, we are going to continue to negotiate. Q. You do seem to be in a hurry about unification. A. Not at all. Newspapers write that, but they are wrong. Of course, there is a certain urgency, but it is not caused by me. I feel that urgency. When I drew up the ten-point unification program in the Bundestag last November, I started with a completely different time frame. I thought that in 1990 we would have a contractual or treaty-based community with East Germany, that in 1991 or 1992 we would have confederative structures. Then in 1993 or 1994 we could have unification. But Mr. [Hans] Modrow [then East German Prime Minister] did not keep his promises. He did not pursue liberalization of the economic system. On the contrary, he made the decision to restore the state security service. That triggered a catastrophic psychological development in the G.D.R. You could read it like a thermometer: every day more and more East Germans moved here. And you must bear in mind the size of the Federal Republic. It is not an enormous country, yet since Jan. 1 of this year 220,000 people have come across. That is why I said in January that we needed economic and currency union. Had I not done so and had we not had the East German elections on March 18, we would now have 600,000 or more people here. Imagine what that would have done. These are good people: craftsmen, programmers, doctors, chemists. They are all needed over there. You cannot rebuild the East German economy without them. Apart from that, over the same period we accommodated 175,000 resettlers of German origin from Poland, Romania and other East European countries. Q. Will this pressure lead to all-German elections this year rather than later? A. On July 1, with the deutsche mark in the G.D.R., millions of people will for the first time hold in their hands a currency that can buy things. They will not start a theoretical or philosophical discussion. Rather, a husband will say to his wife, "Let's go to Paris." And they will walk along the Champs Elysees and feel they are in the center of the world. These people will set the date of the election. I don't know the date, but I would say it will be soon. Ordinarily, politicians ask themselves, Do we have a precedent for this? How was it handled in the past? But what we are doing now has never been done before. We have to decide things in a matter of hours that we would normally decide over a period of years. When Lothar de Maiziere became East Germany's Prime Minister, he didn't even have a working telephone. So I would have to send somebody from West Berlin to see him, or he would have to go to West Berlin and phone me. That was right after Easter. Since then we have completed a state treaty. Had you told me this a year ago, I would have said you were crazy. It's a crazy time, but also a fantastic time. I think of it as a blessing, in a way. And, of course, it is the fulfillment of a dream for Europe and for Germany. Two weeks ago, I paid a visit to the grave of Ludwig Erhard in a village in Bavaria. I told my wife, Had Erhard in 1948 had to consult with all the different people I have to talk to today, we would still have bread rationing. No matter what is going to be negotiated, I have one consolation: the Rhine is flowing on and will reach the sea. It is the same with German unity. And there is something I know today that I did not expect five years ago: this decade will also bring European unity. Q. How important will the U.S. be in Europe's future? A. Very important. For me, Europe would risk a part of its future if it did not include the Americans. We need them not only for military security, as important as that is, but in every possible way--in the economic field, in the cultural field. For the future of Germans in the 21st century, it is of existential importance that our policy rest on two secure pillars: the German-American pillar and the German-French pillar. It is not a matter of either-or but one of as-well-as. And that does not mean we are diminishing other partners. Q. You will probably go into the history books as the "unification Chancellor." A. You'd better not talk about history books. People who want to get into history books don't get into them. Q. But does the possibility influence you in a special way? A. Of course. It influences my feeling about life, but not with a view to the history books. One has a dream. The dream, not just for me but for a whole generation, was to obtain German unity and European unity. I always believed it would happen, but I was very skeptical that I would live to see it. I certainly did not foresee that I would experience it while in this office. Now the opportunity is here. I have never worked so hard in all my life. But I have never been so happy. Q. The events of the past six months have revived certain stereotypes about Germans: they are arrogant, domineering... A. Supposedly. Q. Is there a German national character? A. I suppose there are characteristics you find more in one country than in another. Latin countries, for example, appear to enjoy life more. People in Paris or Rome, faced with an event as momentous to them as German unity is to us, would have celebrated with big parties. But in this country, people sit and study the details and say, "Let's reserve our joy for later." They do not realize that by then they will be so old that they won't be able to experience the joy. I say this in jest, yet I am serious. The fact that in three or four years the area now contained in East Germany will be flourishing will be a typically German achievement. But the question is, will we enjoy it? One must be honest with oneself. We had two wars in this century. Everyone tumbled into World War I out of foolishness. But there is no question that Hitler was responsible for World War II and that the crimes perpetrated by the Nazi tyranny were terrible crimes. We cannot expect that memory to be erased in people's minds. Germans are hardworking and successful. But they are not loved. They are respected. But they are not liked. Now nearly 17 million will be added, and those who recall the past say, "Ah, Kohl is trying to speed things up." They call it "Kohl's blitzkrieg." You have to live with that. I cannot deny our history; I have to accept it. If I meet a Jewish countryman whose family was killed at Auschwitz and who knows German but refuses to speak it, I have to respect that. I can only ask for forgiveness; I have no claim on it. Q. Do you understand why the Poles were so dissatisfied with your legalistic position on their border with Germany? A. The main problem with the Poles, in their assessment of what I proposed, is that they misunderstood my argument. I never left any doubt that on the road to unification, Poland's western border must be guaranteed. There are different opinions on how to do this, but I am firmly convinced that mine will carry the most political weight. This week in the East German parliament and in our Bundestag we will pass resolutions clearly stating that a unified Germany will conclude a treaty with Poland, binding under international law, in which the border will be guaranteed definitively. More cannot be done. Q. Should Berlin be the capital of a united Germany? A. Everyone knows that I am an old supporter of Berlin. But this subject does not have to be dealt with now. It will be debated in an all-German parliament. The decision on a capital cannot be made as long as Soviet troops are deployed there. The Rhine will flow for a long time until this question is raised. If that were our only problem, we would have no problems. Q. What then is Germany's most pressing problem? A. We have economic, material problems, but all of them can be solved. At issue is the moral strength of our people. Have we lost some of that during the years of affluence and prosperity? I don't think so. But a layer of butter and kiwi and shrimp has covered our moral strength. It will reappear when we remove that layer. The term idealism was born here--it was the contribution of German philosophers, and it was abused terribly in this century. There was a backlash, and now we have to achieve a sort of balance. </body> </article> </text>